Wednesday, April 23, 2008

Credit Rating Agencies

Roger Lowenstein has a great new article in this week's NYT magazine about the role that the credit rating agencies played in the mortgage meltdown. He speaks at length about the conflict of interest that the credit rating agencies face, since they collect fees from the very clients that they are evaluating. Of course, these conflicts have always existed, but Lowenstein explains why the conflicts are most pronounced and worrisome when it comes to mortgage-backed securities, as opposed to corporate bonds:

The evidence on whether rating agencies bend to the bankers’ will is mixed. The agencies do not deny that a conflict exists, but they assert that they are keen to the dangers and minimize them. For instance, they do not reward analysts on the basis of whether they approve deals. No smoking gun, no conspiratorial e-mail message, has surfaced to suggest that they are lying. But in structured finance, the agencies face pressures that did not exist when John Moody was rating railroads. On the traditional side of the business, Moody’s has thousands of clients (virtually every corporation and municipality that sells bonds). No one of them has much clout. But in structured finance, a handful of banks return again and again, paying much bigger fees. A deal the size of XYZ can bring Moody’s $200,000 and more for complicated deals. And the banks pay only if Moody’s delivers the desired rating. Tom McGuire, the Jesuit theologian who ran Moody’s through the mid-’90s, says this arrangement is unhealthy. If Moody’s and a client bank don’t see eye to eye, the bank can either tweak the numbers or try its luck with a competitor like S.&P., a process known as “ratings shopping.”

No comments: